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Abstract
This paper explores how discretionary fiscal policies on the revenue side of the 
government budget have reacted to economic fluctuations in European Union 
countries. For this purpose, it uses data on legislated revenue changes and structural 
indicators provided twice per year by National Central Banks of European Union 
countries in the ESCB framework for analysing fiscal policy. The analysis is based on 
the estimation of fiscal policy rules linking these measures of legislated fiscal policy 
changes to the output gap and other control variables. Then, baseline results are 
compared with regression estimates where variations of cyclically-adjusted indicators 
are used as proxy for discretionary fiscal policies, as conventionally proposed in the 
empirical literature on fiscal policy. Results suggest that, overall, legislated changes 
in taxes and social security contributions have responded in a strongly pro-cyclical 
way to the business cycle, while commonly-used cyclical-adjustment methods point 
to a-cyclicality. 
Keywords: Discretionary fiscal policies, government revenues, cyclical sensitivity, 
legislation changes, narrative approach, ESCB disaggregated framework. 
JEL Classification: E62, E65, H20. 5
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This paper re-assesses how discretionary fiscal policies on the revenue side of the 
government budget balance have reacted to economic fluctuations in EU countries, over 
the period 1998 through 2008. The analysis is based on a dataset of legislated changes in 
taxes and social security contributions, collected within the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB). 
When the discretionary component of fiscal policy is under investigation, indicators that 
have been ‘cyclically-adjusted’ through statistical methods are generally employed. Based 
on cyclically-adjusted fiscal variables, a number of papers have argued that discretionary 
fiscal policies tend to be a-cyclical (i.e. disconnected from the economic cycle) in the 
European Union, in particular after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty (see e.g. 
Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay, 2002; European Commission, 2006, Wyplosz, 2006). 
As regards in particular the cyclical behaviour of structural government revenues, while 
some authors have suggested that they are predominantly a-cyclical (see e.g. Galí and 
Perotti, 2003), some other have found evidence of counter-cyclicality (see in particular 
Turrini, 2008, Fatás and Mihov, 2009).  
While cyclically-adjusted indicators represent a useful benchmark to evaluate the fiscal 
policy stance, especially in the absence of more detailed information on changes in 
legislation passed by parliaments, they are clearly subject to a number of limitations. These 
latter are notably related to the high degree of uncertainty intrinsic in statistical smoothing 
techniques used to extract the cyclical component of budgetary categories (see e.g. 
Canova, 1998, Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004), Darby and Melitz, 2008).  
Against this background, the present paper uses a dataset that includes legislated 
government revenue changes for 27 EU countries, as reported by National Central Banks 
(NCBs) according to the ESCB framework for fiscal analysis. In fact, changes in laws that 
have a budgetary impact should reflect discretionary fiscal actions more appropriately than 
(changes in) fiscal cyclically-adjusted indicators, which might vary depending on factors 
not specifically related to discretionary actions, as highlighted in Kremer et al (2006).  
Changes in legislation for overall taxes and social contributions are used, together with 
their breakdown into direct taxes payable by households, direct taxes payable by 
enterprises, indirect taxes and social security contributions. For each of these categories, 
the dataset employed here records the estimated budgetary impact of legislative changes, 
in terms of (nominal) size and duration. It can be argued that this approach is close in spirit 6
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to the ‘narrative’ one proposed by Romer and Romer (2007a, 2007b, 2008) for the analysis 
of the impact of legislated tax changes on the US economic growth. However, these 
authors have also identified the motivation behind legislated policy decisions, while our 
sources do not allow such a classification.  
This novel dataset is used for the estimation of fiscal policy rules linking revenue 
legislation changes to the output gap and a set of control variables. In addition, as a 
comparison, panel regressions where the dependent variable is the (change of) cyclically 
adjusted indicators are also estimated, as conventionally proposed in the empirical 
literature on fiscal policy. Our results show that, in line with existing studies, changes in 
cyclically-adjusted taxes and social security contributions seem to be disconnected from 
the economic cycle in EU countries, over the last ten years. However, when legislated 
measures are used instead of cyclical-adjusted indicators, it is found that, overall, 
permanent revenue changes respond in a strongly pro-cyclical way to the business cycle. 
In particular, this result appears to be the outcome of a significant pro-cyclical reaction of 
direct taxes payable by households and of social security contributions. More specifically, 
there is evidence that direct taxes paid by households have been significantly reduced 
during economic expansions. As for indirect taxes, while estimates based on cyclically-
adjusted indicators suggest pro-cyclicality, changes in indirect tax legislation seem to be a-
cyclical. In addition, and interestingly, indirect taxes are the only revenue subcomponent 
that appears to have been used to stabilize the government debt-to-GDP ratio.    
While an extension of this analysis to cover the ongoing economic crisis will be certainly 
of interest, our findings already suggest that a sound identification of the discretionary 
component of fiscal policy is of key importance to appropriately assess how fiscal policies 
are implemented over the economic cycle. This is particularly relevant in the context of the 
EU fiscal framework and the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact, that 














This paper aims to provide new evidence on the cyclical stance of fiscal policy in 
European Union (EU) countries, over the period 1998 through 2008. In particular, it is 
explored whether EU governments have adopted counter-cyclical revenue-based fiscal 
policies that helped to smooth the business cycle, or whether they have acted in a pro-
cyclical way, for instance by raising taxes during slowdowns while implementing 
expansionary policies in booming times, thereby exacerbating swings of the cycle.  
The paper focuses on legislated changes in taxes and social security contributions, as 
defined by the ESCB disaggregated approach (see Kremer et. al, 2006). In fact, as stressed 
in this framework, changes in laws that have a budgetary impact should reflect the 
discretionary component of fiscal policy more effectively than commonly used cyclically-
adjusted fiscal indicators. The latter might be affected by a number of limitations, mostly 
related to the filtering techniques applied to net out the automatic impact of the cycle from 
headline fiscal figures (see e.g. Canova, 1998, Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004), Darby and 
Melitz, 2008).  
Measures of legislated changes in taxes and social security contributions are based on the 
information collected within the ESCB. 
The cyclical stance of revenue-based discretionary fiscal policies in the EU is assessed by 
estimating fiscal policy rules linking these measures of legislated changes to the output gap 
and other control variables. In particular, the cyclical reaction of discretionary changes in 
overall taxes and social security contributions is analyzed, together with the cyclical 
behaviour of four sub-categories of government revenues (direct taxes paid by households, 
direct taxes paid by enterprises, indirect taxes and social security contributions). Finally, 
results from these baseline regressions are compared to what is obtained using fiscal 
indicators which are cyclically-adjusted according to the ESCB disaggregated approach.  
Based on this analysis it emerges that, in line with existing studies, changes in cyclically-
adjusted taxes and social security contributions seem to be disconnected from the 
economic cycle in EU countries, over the last ten years. However, when legislated 
measures are used instead of cyclical-adjusted indicators, it is found that, overall, 
permanent revenue changes have responded in a strongly pro-cyclical way to the business 
cycle. In particular, this result appears to be the outcome of a significant pro-cyclical 
reaction of direct taxes payable by households and of social security contributions. More 
specifically, there is evidence that direct taxes paid by households have been significantly 8
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reduced during economic expansions. As for indirect taxes, while estimates based on 
cyclically-adjusted indicators suggest pro-cyclicality, changes in indirect tax legislation 
seem to be a-cyclical. In addition, indirect taxes are the only revenue subcomponent that 
appears to have been used to stabilize the government debt-to-GDP ratio. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a review the empirical 
literature that explores the cyclical sensitivity of discretionary fiscal policies, based on 
cyclically-adjusted indicators, and ex-post data, is provided. Section 3 describes how the 
dataset used in this analysis is constructed using information provided by NCBs. In section 
4, the fiscal policy reaction functions used in the analysis are described. In section 5, the 
main results from the analysis are shown and commented. Section 6 is devoted to a series 




The bulk of the macroeconomic literature typically employs (changes of) “cyclically-
adjusted” indicators as a proxy for the discretionary component of fiscal policy. Based on 
cyclically-adjusted indicators regularly published by the main international institutions, a 
number of policy and academic papers have investigated issues related to discretionary 
fiscal policies (see, for example, Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996).  
In particular, as regards the issue of the policy responsiveness to economic fluctuations 
(which is often referred to as ‘cyclical sensitivity’), the standard approach in the fiscal 
policy literature is to estimate fiscal policy rules linking (levels or changes of) cyclically-
adjusted fiscal variables, as measures of the discretionary component of fiscal policy, to 
business cycle indicators (generally, the output gap) and other explanatory variables, such 
as, in particular, the public debt (see e.g. Taylor, 2000; Auerbach, 2002). Within this 
literature, most papers employ “ex-post” data, i.e. observations in a revised form taken 
from the latest available vintage, to study “actual” or “realized” policies.
1   
                                                           
1 Recently, a new strand of literature focuses on fiscal policy plans, or “intentions”, rather than actual policies. In 
particular, Cimadomo (2007) proposes to estimate fiscal policy rules based on an information set which closely mimic 
the one available to fiscal policy makers at the time of budgeting. Budget plans reported at the time of budgetary 
decisions, and other real-time macro indicators, are used in this framework. It is found that ex-ante fiscal plans are 
counter-cyclical, especially in expasions, whereas ex-post data point to a-cyclicality (See Beetsma and Giuliodori (2008) 
and Giuliodori and Beetsma (2007) for related studies). At the same time, other papers focus on actual policies, and 
incorporate revised information as regards fiscal indicators and real-time data for the output gap and other explanatory 
variables (see Forni and Momigliano (2005) and Golinelli and Momigliano (2006)). 
Review of the literature based on cyclically-adjusted indicators  2.9
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While the empirical evidence from this literature is quite mixed, a relatively large 
consensus has emerged on the fact that (ex-post) discretionary fiscal policies seem to be 
substantially  a-cyclical in EU countries, especially as far as government revenues are 
concerned. In particular, Galì and Perotti (2003) estimate fiscal policy rules for a panel of 
euro area countries and find that cyclically-adjusted budget balances have not reacted to 
the business cycle in the period that followed the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1992. When they focus on the breakdown between (cyclically-adjusted) spending and 
revenue, they show that both these components seem to have been a-cyclical over the 
period considered. Similar results are found by Turrini (2008), who however highlights 
that the substantial neutrality of the cyclically-adjusted budget balance over the cycle is 
likely to stem from the combined effect of a significant counter-cyclical response of 
revenue compensated by a pro-cyclical reaction of expenditure. More recently, Fatás and 
Mihov (2009) have shown that cyclically-adjusted spending has become more pro-cyclical 
in euro area countries, after the adoption of the single currency, whereas cyclically-
adjusted taxes have become more counter-cyclical. Many other studies employing 
cyclically-adjusted budget balances, and revised data, tend to confirm that discretionary 
fiscal policies are a-cyclical in EU and euro area countries (see e.g. Ballabriga and 
Martinez-Mongay, 2002; OECD, 2003; European Commission, 2006, Wyplosz, 2006).  
While structural indicators represent a useful benchmark to evaluate the fiscal policy 
stance, especially in the absence of more detailed information on changes in legislation 
passed by parliaments, they are clearly subject to a number of limitations. These latter are 
notably related to the substantial uncertainty inherent in the cyclical adjustment procedure. 
In particular, there is a certain degree of arbitrariness in the selection of the statistical 
smoothing technique used to extract the cyclical component from the unadjusted level of 
the budget and budgetary categories.  In addition, while standard methods imply that 
elasticities of budgetary components with respect to output are treated as constant, 
empirical evidence suggest that they can vary over time and that they might be 
characterized by high volatility (see Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004), Eschenbach and 
Schuknecht (2004)). Moreover, additional difficulties may stem from the (un-consensual) 
definition of temporary measures, as long as structural indicators are considered. Finally, it 
cannot be excluded that not only unemployment benefits react to the cycle (as generally 
assumed), but also other categories of social spending, such as for example age- and 
health-related expenditure as well as incapacity and sick benefits, move in response to 
cyclical fluctuations (on this point, see in particular Darby and Melitz, 2008). Therefore, as 10
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1118
November 2009
discussed by some authors (see, for example, Chalk, 2002; Larch and Salto, 2005) 
commonly-used cyclically-adjusted fiscal indicators may provide inaccurate measures of 
discretionary policies, and empirical results based on these indicators should be interpreted 
cautiously. Against this background, as also suggested by Kremer et. al (2006), data on 
legislated policy changes should reflect better the discretionary stance of fiscal policy. 
 
3. A dataset for discretionary fiscal policies in the EU 
 
The starting point of this study is the identification of legislated revenue changes as 
measures of the discretionary component of fiscal policy. To that aim, data from the 
ESCB’s disaggregated approach are used. Data include discretionary measures that have 
been approved by the respective national parliament. These data may differ from official 
government estimates, as NCBs’ fiscal experts apply their own judgement regarding the 
composition, the duration, and the size of approved fiscal packages. All in all, information 
has been combined to compile two complementary datasets. The first one (based on the so-
called ‘disaggregated’ approach’ (DA) tables, as described below) incorporates data on 
legislated revenue changes and structural indicators (including cyclical adjusted indicators 
and other fiscal indicators) for 19 EU countries. The second (compiled on the basis of DA 
tables and on further complementary information from NCBs) comprises only legislated 
revenue changes, but for the larger set of 27-EU countries.  
Two facts should be stressed. First, while the spending-side is also covered in DA tables, 
legislative acts on expenditure are usually numerous and the assessment of their effects 
often involves a number of arbitrary assumptions (see also Kremer et al., 2006). Second, 
DA  tables do not provide information on temporary measures affecting revenue 
subcomponents, therefore the analysis will focus on permanent (legislated) discretionary 
measures on the revenue side of the government budget.  
In the following, an overview of the information provided in DA tables, and the 
construction of the dataset, is described in more detail.
2 
 
                                                           
2 It is interesting to note that the data on legislated changes in the EU countries collected in the framework of the ESCB 
disaggregated approach are to some extent similar to the data gathered by Romer and Romer (2007a, 2007b, 2008) for 
their studies on the effects of legislated tax changes on US economic activity and on public spending developments in 
that country. Romer and Romer use a ‘narrative record’ of presidential speeches, executive-branch documents, 
Congressional reports and budget laws, to identify the size, timing, and principal motivation for all major postwar tax 
policy actions. Based on this data, they uncover that tax increases are highly contractionary in the US. The data reported 
in tables from the ESCB disaggregated approach also provide a description of the size, timing and nature of legislated 
revenue changes that took place in EU countries. On the other hand, at the current juncture, these data do not allow to 
identify also the motivation behind each policy decision (e.g. cyclical stabilization, deficit control, or other ‘exogenous’ 
reasons) as in the dataset of Romer and Romer. 11
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3.1. The ‘disaggregated approach’ tables 
 
DA tables are complied in a standardized form according to ‘ESCB disaggregated 
approach’.
3 These tables report changes in cyclically-adjusted total expenditure and 
revenue, along with the breakdown of the latter into its four main categories (see Table A1 
for an example of a DA table for Italy, as reported in Kremer et al. (2006)). In particular, 
structural ratios are computed for a) Direct taxes payable by corporations (
dte R ' ); b) 
Direct taxes payable by households (
dth R ' ); c) Indirect taxes (
itx R ' ); and d) social 
contributions (
sct R ' ). The sum of these four categories is defined as overall taxes and 
social contributions, simply labelled as overall revenue (
txs R ' ) in this paper.
4  
As regards the cyclical-adjustment procedure, the approach developed by Bouthevillain et 
al. (2001) is followed. In particular, cyclically-adjusted revenue and expenditure categories 
are adjusted individually by applying specific elasticitites to the deviation of their 
respective macroeconomic bases from an estimated trend. Specifically, for each budgetary 
category considered, labelled as j, the structural level 













u x  is the unadjusted level of the budget item j, 
j
c x  is its cyclical component and 
j
T x  
the temporary measures. In this context, all variables are expressed as ratios of nominal 
trend GDP, as estimated through the Hodrick-Prescott methodology. DA tables span a 
period typically ranging from t-8 until t+2. For example, the Spring 2008 vintage include 
data from 2000 through 2010. 
Importantly, DA tables also incorporate data on legislated changes, which defined as 
j " '  
hereafter, for each budgetary category j.
5 The impact of legislated changes in DA tables is 
expressed as a ratio of trend GDP. To be noted, in this context the difference between 
                                                           
3 See Kremer et al. (2006) for a detailed escription of this methodology.  
4 Overall taxes and social contributions might differ from total revenue as the former do not included non-
tax-related revenue, as for example revenue from EU funds. 
5  The “first-difference” notation 
j " ' to indicate the fiscal impact of legislated changes is a simple 
convention, as in reality “levels” of legislation (and their implied budgetary effects) are unobversed. On the 
other hand, the budgetary impact of a change in legislation can be estimated. 
 12
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changes in cyclically-adjusted indicators and legislated changes for each revenue category  
j is accounted for by three separate factors: i) fiscal drag (
j fd ), ii) decoupling of the tax 
base from GDP (




3.2. Data availability and data construction 
Two complementary datasets have been constructed, based on DA tables and on other 
information from NCBs:   
1. The first dataset incorporates an unbalanced panel for 19 EU countries, over the 
period 1998-2008, including both changes in structural indicators (
j R ' ) and 
legislated measures (
j " ' ). Sources of this dataset are only DA tables;  
2. The second datasets comprises an (unbalanced) panel covering 27-EU countries, 
where only data on legislated measures are incorporated. This dataset is 
constructed based on DA tables and other complementary information from NCBs.  
The analysis is based on the Spring 2008 vintage of DA tables, but information from 
earlier vintages has also been used, in case of missing values. Table A2 reports the time 
and country coverage of these two datasets. To be noted, the first dataset does not include 
8 EU countries (Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom) based on the fact that only legislated changes, but not cyclically-adjusted 
revenue indicators, are available for these countries.  
The sample used in the empirical analysis ends in 2008 given that in projection years 
actual output tends to converge to the potential one for the majority of countries 
considered (as it typically occurs at the end of the forecast horizon of projection exercises). 
Therefore, an analysis which focuses on the cyclical stance of fiscal policy for these 
projection years would not make much sense, given that the output gap tends to shrink 
over these years. 
                                                           
6 These three factors, that account for changes in structural revenue ratios (¨R) beyond the ones explained by 
legislation changes, are defined as follows: i) the ‘fiscal drag’ refers to the increase in average tax rates in a 
progressive income tax scheme that stems from an increase in nominal income, due to inflation or real 
growth. As such, the fiscal drag may affect structural revenues, even in the absence of legislation changes; ii) 
the so-called ‘decoupling of the tax base form GDP’ refers to the possibility that revenue ratios to nominal 
(trend) GDP might change even when the elasticity with respect to the macroeconomic base amounts to 
unity, and even when legislation is unmodified. This may occur when the (trend) growth rate of the tax base 
deviates from the (trend) growth rate of nominal GDP; iii) changes in the structural revenue ratios not 
explained by the two factors decribed above, and by legislation changes, are denoted as ‘residuals’.  A more 
thorough description of these components and details concerning their computation can be found in Kremer 
et al. (2006). 13
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From a preliminary descriptive analysis of data on legislated changes collected as 
documented above, some interesting evidence emerges. In particular, focusing on 
observations averaged over all countries considered, Table 1a presents the correlation 
matrix of cyclical-adjusted changes of total taxes and social contributions (
txs R ' ) and its 
driving factors as defined by disaggregated approach. We note that unsystematic events, as 
captured by the residual component 
txs rs , seem to have been important in explaining 
structural developments of taxes and social contributions. Looking at the impact of the 
other three factors, it turns out that legislated changes seem to be only weakly correlated 
with changes in structural revenues. 
Table 1b reports the variance-covariance matrix across legislated changes relative to each 
revenue category j. Two facts are worth noticing. First, legislated changes display low 
cross-correlations. Second, the bulk of the variability of the total change in legislation is 
due to changes of direct taxes payable by households, whereas changes in direct taxes 
payable by corporations, indirect taxes and social security contributions explain less (as 
documented by a lower cross-correlation of these items with the aggregate variable). This 
suggests that the former policy instrument seem to have been predominantly used by 
European fiscal policymakers in setting their revenue policies. 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
In order to assess the cyclical sensitivity of legislated changes in the EU, during the period 
1998-2008, and to compare results from regressions based on cyclically-adjusted 
indicators as obtained from the disaggregated approach (for the restricted set of 19 EU 
countries), we run separately the following panel regressions: 
 
  t i i t i t i
j
t i t i
j
t i B R Y R ,
'
, 1 , 1 , , ,
~
H D I J E        '   į Z  (2)
  t i i t i t i
j
t i t i
j
t i B R Y ,
'
, 1 , 1 , , ,
~
H D I J E        '   į Z "  (3) 
  
for i =1,….N and t =1,…..,Ti  where N is the number of countries included in our sample 
while Ti  is the number of observations available for each country. 
We estimate model (2) and (3) for the aggregate series of overall taxes and social 
contributions, and for each individual revenue-side budgetary category j. As discussed 14
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above, both the two discretionary fiscal policy indicators considered, 
j
t i R , '  and
j
t i, " ' , are 
expressed as percentage of nominal trend GDP. 
The explanatory variable 
j
t i R 1 ,
~
  measures the level of the cyclically-adjusted component of 
each budgetary category j. It is computed as the difference between the unadjusted volume 
of each budgetary item j and its cyclical component divided by the nominal trend GDP (as 
estimated by NCBs). To be noted,
j
t i R 1 ,
~
  includes temporary measures while
j




t i R 1 ,
~
  captures persistence of budgetary policy decisions. In fact, it is 
reasonable to assume that the initial level of each revenue categories affects the way 
discretionary policies for that item are set for the following year. For example, it can be 
expected that the higher the initial level of taxation (in structural terms) the higher the size 
of the downward adjustment implemented. According to this hypothesis, we expect that 
the coefficient J  ranges between minus one and zero (i.e. 0 1    J ). 
j
t i R 1 ,
~
  is also used a 
proxy to capture persistence in equation (3) since, clearly, it is not possible to reconstruct 
levels of ‘legislation’.
8 In addition, the inclusion of 
j
t i R 1 ,
~
  in equation (3) facilitates 
comparisons with model (2), as the set of control variables is exactly the same in the two 
equations. 
The economic cycle is represented by the output gap, labelled as  t i Y , . This is the key 
variable used to measure the systematic response of fiscal discretionary measures to 
cyclical conditions.  t i Y ,  is computed by NCBs as the difference between nominal GDP and 
nominal trend GDP (estimated through the Hodrick and Prescott filter), over trend GDP. A 
positive value of E  indicates counter-cyclicality, i.e. taxes or social contributions increase 
during economic booms and decrease during slowdowns. On the other hand, negative 
value of E  points to pro-cyclicality given that discretionary fiscal policies become looser 
during expansions and tighter during downturns.  
                                                           
7 In principle, levels of the structural ratio indicators as computed in equation (1) should be used as 
regressors. Unfortunately, the lack of information concerning temporary measures adopted by national 
governments and impacting on each budgetary item makes it impossible to re-construct levels of the variable 
j
t i R , . For this reason, the variable  j
t i R ,
~  is used as a proxy. This variable is computed without netting out the 
temporary measures. 
8 An experiment based on the inclusion of lagged values of  " '  has also been carried out. Unfortunately, 
however, these controls enter insignificantly in the regression equations. In addition, empirical fiscal policy 
rules are generally specified such that the initial state of public finances, as represented by fiscal variables 
included on the right-hand-side of the regression equation, are expressed in levels rather than in differences 
(see e.g. Galí and Perotti (2003)). This is consistent with the idea that fiscal policymakers are more 
concerned about levels of deficits, revenues and expenditure, rather than their growth rates.  15
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Following several other papers (See e.g. Bohn (1998), Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay 
(2002), Wyplosz (2002), Favero (2003)), we also incorporate a “debt stabilization” motive 
by adding as a regressor the general government debt (relative to nominal trend GDP) 
outstanding at the time of the budget decision, denoted as  1 ,  t i B
9 A positive sign of I  is 
expected because more indebtedness may lead to more concern about fiscal sustainability 
and induce the governments to adopt more stringent discretionary measures.    
The vector  t i, Z  includes the following set of additional variables: a) NONACTIVEi,t  , 
which accounts for “population ageing” effects on fiscal policy making process (see e.g. 
Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2008). This variable is computed as the share of the population 
that is not of working age (i.e. the number of 15 year or younger plus the number of 65 or 
older);
 10 b) ELECTi,t, acts as a control for the possible influence of electoral cycle, and 
takes a value of one (zero) if year t is (not) an election year
11; c) EMU15i, is a dummy 
variable which equals one for years in which EMU countries have joined the European 
Monetary Union, and zero otherwise. The idea is to check whether the fiscal policy stance 
differs between countries belonging to EMU area and others EU countries. In particular, 
we expect that accession countries have incentives to pursue tighter fiscal policies in order 
to consolidate public finances, meet the convergence criteria and benefit from joining the 
single currency; d) Ti, is a linear trend that is intended to capture common third factors 
driving discretionary fiscal behaviour of all countries that are unlikely due to common 
economic circumstances. In practice, we account for the possibility that both  t i R , '  and 
t i, " '  might evolve according to a deterministic trend (see e.g. Afonso, Agnello and 
Furceri, 2008; Fatàs and Mihov, 2003). Finally,  i D  denote the country-specific effects, and 
t i, H  are the error terms. 
A problem related to estimation of model (2)-(3) concerns the potential reverse causality 
between  t i Y ,  and our dependent variables. Therefore, this issue is tackled by estimating the 
panel regressions through instrumental variables (IV/2SLS) method (see e.g. Jaimovich 
and Panizza (2007)). In particular, we instrument  t i Y ,  by using its lagged value,  1  t i Y , , and 
the lagged value of the output gap of the United States (see e.g. and Galì and Perotti 
                                                           
9 Data on nominal debt are taken from World Economic Outlook (WEO). 
10 Source: Ameco dataset. 
11 Recent work show that elections may play a role in explaining the fiscal stance in euro-area countries in 
the past decades (see e.g. Golinelli and Momigliano (2008) and Debrun et al. (2008)). Data on election years 
are taken from the website of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(htpp://www.idea.int) and from the Election Resources on the Internet website http://electionresource.org. 16
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(2003)).
12 In addition, we will estimate our models also using the fixed-effects OLS 
estimator. In fact, although OLS estimates are in principle biased if the output gap reacts to 
fiscal policy actions, it cannot be discarded that the reversal causality is weak given that 
we are considering sub-components of the budget balance, whose influence on the 
economic activity might be feeble. In addition, OLS estimates serve as a useful 
benchmark, given that they are not affected by the choice of instruments.  
                   
5. Baseline results 
First, results for the aggregate indicator, as represented by overall taxes and social 
contributions, and panel regressions (2)-(3), are reported in Table 2. Column 1 and 2 of 
that Table presents IV/2SLS and OLS estimates of regression (2), which include as 
dependent variable structural taxes and social contribution, for the panel of 19 EU 
countries. The estimated coefficient on output gap,E ˆ , is not statistically significant 
suggesting that changes in revenue items have behaved in a-cyclical way.  
When legislated changes are considered, results on cyclical sensitivity turn out to be 
remarkably different. In fact, as shown in columns 3 and 4 (for the 19-countries sample), 
and columns 5 and 6 (for the 27-countries sample), it is found that changes in taxes and 
social contribution laws are highly responsive to cyclical conditions. In particular, the 
negative sign of the parameter E ˆ  indicates that changes in legislation have been 
implemented in a pro-cyclical way, i.e. governments have tended to reduce tax pressure 
and cut social contributions during booms while increase revenues in recessions. The 
effects are sizeable: an increase of one percentage point in  t i Y ,  induces policymakers to cut 
taxes and social contributions by about 0.17-0.16 percent (of nominal trend GDP).    
Regarding the other parameters, the estimated coefficients Jˆ are significant and have the 
expected negative sign in each specification. This implies that regardless the measure 
considered, discretionary fiscal policy actions are driven by a “permanent” component, 
txs
t i R ,
~
. The coefficients on debt, I ˆ, are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, this result 
does not necessarily imply that fiscal decisions are not sensitive to debt developments, as it 
cannot be excluded that debt stabilization is achieved mainly through expenditure-based 
policies. Analyzing the significance of controls t i, Z , it is found that the variable EMU15 is 
                                                           
12 The U.S. output gap is used as instrument given that a business cycle variable which is likely to be 
correlated (for reasons other than the existence of coordinated fiscal policies) with EU countries-specific 
output gap is needed.    17
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always significant and has negative sign, in line with the possible interpretation proposed 
above. In particular, it is likely that the incentives to join the monetary union have induced 
accession countries to increase taxation and consolidate public finances with a view of 
joining the EMU. The demographic variable NONACTIVE seems to play a role only 
for
txs
t i R , '  while it is never statistically significant when legislated changes are considered. 
Finally, it is found that the electoral cycle does not seem to be relevant in determining 
discretionary fiscal decisions.
13  
As an additional set of results, Table 3 presents estimates for EMU countries. By 
comparing results to those obtained using the full sample (and reported in Table 2), 
previous conclusions remain quantitatively and qualitatively unaltered. In fact, there seems 
to be no sizeable differences, between EU-19, EU-27 and EMU countries, in the 
responsiveness of legislated changes to the economic cycle. 
 
5.1 Estimating the cyclical sensitivity of revenue-side categories   
This section is devoted to examine whether the cyclical sensitivity varies across revenue 
categories and to investigate to what extent each of these budgetary items determine the 
pro-cyclical nature of revenue-side discretionary fiscal policies. To that end, panel 
regressions (2)-(3) are re-estimated for each of the four revenue budgetary items 
considered. Results are reported in Tables (4)-(7). As in Table 2 and 3, both IV and OLS 
estimates are provided. 
Focusing on the cyclical sensitivity parameter, it is found that results for direct taxes 
payable by households and social contributions are qualitatively the same of those 
obtained for overall taxes and social contributions. In fact, from Table (4) and (7), it can be 
noticed that while their cyclically-adjusted components (
dth
t i R , '  and 
sct
t i R , ' ) are not 
responsive to the economic cycle, legislation changes (
dth
t i, " '  and 
sct
t i, " ' ) behave in a pro-
cyclical way. However, some differences emerge as regards the size of the coefficientsE ˆ . 
As shown in columns 3 through 6 of Table 4, it seems that legislated changes impacting on 
taxes payable by households are highly pro-cyclical. In particular, an increase of one 
percentage point in the output gap induces policymakers to cut these taxes by about 0.10-
0.11% of nominal trend GDP. On the other side, the degree of pro-cyclicality of legislated 
changes associated to social contributions is lower, as suggested by results in columns 3 
                                                           
13 See also Turrini (2008) for similar results on the electoral cycle.  18
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through 5 of Table 7). In fact, an increase of one percentage point in the output gap 
reduces social contributions by around 0.04%. This effect, although rather small, is still 
statistically significant. 
Results from regression estimated based on taxes by corporations and indirect taxes point 
to different conclusions.  In particular, while results on fiscal rules estimated using 
dte
t i R , '  
point clearly towards counter-cyclicality (see Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5), estimates 
based on  legislated changes on taxes payable by enterprises indicate always a-cyclicality. 
Turning to indirect taxes, results from Table 6 show that changes in cyclically-adjusted 
indirect taxes respond in a pro-cyclical way to the cycle while, when legislated changes are 
considered, results indicate that there are not responsive to economic developments. 
Overall, these findings suggest that the observed a-cyclicality of the changes in the 
cyclically-adjusted overall taxes and social contributions seems to be explained by a-
cyclicality of both taxes payable by households and social contributions and, on the other 
hand, by the possibility that the counter-cyclicality found for taxes payable by corporations 
offsets the pro-cyclical behaviour of changes in indirect taxes. At the same time, as regards 
legislated revenue changes, their pro-cyclical behaviour can be interpreted as driven by a 
significant pro-cyclicality of changes in taxes payable by households and (though to a 
minor extent) social contributions.  
Finally, by analyzing the statistical significance of the other explanatory variables in each 
specification, it emerges that, with the exception of legislated changes in indirect taxes, the 
coefficient Jˆ is always significant and with the expected negative sign. On the contrary, 
the parameter I ˆ has been found to be significant and with the expected positive sign only 
in the regressions of legislated changes on indirect taxes. This suggests that, indirect taxes 
are the only revenue subcomponent that seems to have been used to stabilize the debt-
output ratio.  
 Regarding the importance of control variables,  t i, Z , it is found that only for indirect taxes, 
and in the equation of cyclically-adjusted taxes payable by households, the dummy 
EMU15 is statistically significant.  
  
5.2 Testing for asymmetries 
In this section the possible presence of non-linearity in the way discretionary fiscal policies 
react to the evolution of the economic cycle and to debt accumulation is explored.  19
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In order to test whether there is a significant difference in the policymaker’s response 
along the business cycle, the notion of “good times” as periods of positive output gap, and 
“bad” ones as years in which the output gap is negative, is used.
14 Asymmetries in the 
discretionary fiscal response may also be at play as regards the level of government debt. 
In the framework of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the Stability Growth Pact 
(SGP), for instance, fiscal authorities may pursue more sustainable policies, attempting to 
reduce government debt, when the 60% ceiling is approached or exceeded. More 
generally, it can be expected that governments are more concerned about the sustainability 
of public finances when the government debt is high rather that when it is low.  
In order to account for asymmetric effects the following panel regressions are estimated: 
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The variables  t i Y ,  and  1 ,  t i B  from the baseline model (3) have been replaced in equations 
(4)-(5) with two sets of regressors. The first set of regressors is constructed by interacting 
t i Y ,  with a dummy indicator which equals one (zero) if the output gap is positive (negative) 
and their associated coefficients are 
 E  and
 E , respectively. The second one is computed 
by interacting  1 ,  t i B  with a dummy indicator which equals one (zero) when the debt at time 
t-1 is above (below) the 60% ceiling. The coefficients associated to these regressors are 
denoted as 
 I and 
 I . 
Tables 8a and 8b report estimates of the panel models (4) and (5) respectively, when we 
use the sample of nineteen EU countries. In addition, Table 8c shows results from model 
(5) when we consider the group of twenty-seven EU countries. Specifically, for each 
                                                           
14  The same approach is followed by many other papers on fiscal policy rules (see e.g. Gavin and Perotti, 
1997; European Commission, 2004; Turrini, 2008; OECD, 2003) 20
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budget category, we report the estimates from three possible nested specifications of our 
models. In particular, the first column shows estimates accounting only for asymmetric 
responses of discretionary fiscal policy indicators to the economic cycle. The second one 
considers the possibility of asymmetries linking discretionary measures to debt 
developments. Finally, the third column reports estimates from the nested model, where 
the reaction to both the output gap and debt development can be characterized by two 
regimes.  
To formally test for asymmetric effects in these models, some Wald tests are proposed. 
The first one tests the null hypothesis
    E E , i.e. equality of coefficients associated with 
positive and negative output gaps. The second one tests the linear restriction 0    
  E E , 
i.e. equal coefficients, and jointly not statistically different from zero. These two tests are 
also carried out for the parameters 
 I  and 
 I , which measure the reaction of dicretionary 
fiscal policies to dept developments when the debt ratio is respectively above and below 
the 60% threshold. Results are reported at the bottom of each table.  
Table 8a indicates that, when we consider cyclically-adjusted indicators as a measure of 
discretionary fiscal policy, changes in taxes and social contributions seem to be 
disconnected from the economic cycle, and do not behave in an asymmetric way (in fact, 
both the parameter estimates
 E ˆ  and 
 E ˆ  are not statistically significant, and the Wald test 
reject the null that 
    E E ˆ ˆ ). Analyzing the behaviour of the revenue-side budgetary 
subcomponents, we find that changes in direct taxes by households and social 
contributions remain a-cyclical in each phase of the cycle. At the same time, changes in 
taxes payable by enterprises have responded in a counter-cyclical way, especially during 
bad times (
 E ˆ =0.15) rather than good times (
 E ˆ =0.08). However, the hypothesis than 
these two coefficients are statistically different is rejected by the reported Wald statistic. 
Finally, asymmetric effects due to debt development do not seem to exist. 
Table 8b and 8c show that legislated changes in taxes and social contributions occur in a 
strongly pro-cyclical way in “good times” and in an a-cyclical way during “bad times”. 
This evidence holds in particular for the sample of 19 countries, for which the Wald test 
rejects (at the 10% level) the null hypothesis that 
    E E . At the same time, as regards 
the panel of 27-EU countries, while the coefficient associated with positive output gaps is 
again negative and significant at the 99% level, and 
 E ˆ  is not significantly different from 21
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zero, there is no strong statistical evidence that the two parameters are different from each 
other (although the Wald statistic associated is very close to the 10% critical level).  
As regards the legislation process related to each single revenue category, changes in taxes 
payable by households seem to be strongly pro-cyclical when the output gap is positive. In 
particular, while the parameter 
 E ˆ  is equal to -0.10 for the sub-group of 19 countries, it 
decreases to -0.07 for the overall country sample. A possible interpretation of this result is 
that the fiscal position of governments tends to improve during economic upswings, at 
least partially on account of the fiscal drag which operates in progressive tax systems (e.g. 
in European ones). As a consequence, EU governments may have reacted to these 
developments by lowering personal income taxes, as a compensation of losses in 
disposable income due to the fiscal drag. 
Our results also indicate that asymmetries related to the reaction of legislative changes to 
debt developments do not seem to be at play. In fact, although the coefficients 
 I  and 
 I , 
in the equation of legislated change in indirect taxes are both significant and positive (as 
expected), their difference is not statistically different from zero.  
Finally, estimates indicate that asymmetries due to economic and debt development do not 
seem to occur simultaneously. 
 
 
6. Robustness checks 
The robustness of the empirical findings presented above is explored in different 
directions. First, we test whether our results are robust to various alternative business cycle 
indicators. In particular, we re-estimate our baseline models (2)-(3) by replacing the output 
gap as reported by NCBs with the one published by the European Commission in its 
AMECO database. In addition, we check the sensitivity of our results by using the simple 
growth rate of real GDP as an alternative measure of the cycle. In fact, it cannot be 
excluded that fiscal policy makers do not base their decisions on the output gap, due for 
example to the unreliability of potential output estimates, and might use simply real GDP 
growth as a proxy for the state of the economy. Estimates of models (2)-(3) for overall 
taxes and social contributions obtained by these alternative measures of cyclical conditions 
are reported in Table 9, along with our baseline estimates. Results from the use of the 
AMECO output gap clearly point to results in line with the baseline: overall taxes and 
social contributions appear to be more pro-cyclical when legislated changes are 22
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considered, while a-cyclical when structural indicators are used (Columns 2, 5 and 8). 
When GDP growth is used instead, regressions based on structural indicators yield to a 
statistically insignificant E ˆ .However, when legislated revenue changes are incorporated, 
E ˆ becomes negative, indicating again pro-cyclicality, as in the baseline case (Columns 3, 
6 and 9). 
A further robustness test consists of examining the effects of including in equations (2) and 
(3) additional control variables. Specifically, we are interested in testing whether the 
omission of variables potentially correlated to
txs R ' or 
txs " ' , may impact significantly on 
the relation between discretionary fiscal policy behaviour and economic fluctuations. In 
particular, we control for changes in total and primary government spending and changes 
in the inflation rate. In addition, we check whether the ideology behind national political 
parties in power influence the degree of fiscal policy discretion.  
By controlling for changes in government spending we account for the possibility that 
changes in taxes and social contributions may be driven by changes in expenditures.
15 In 
order to test for such hypothesis, we use two measures of spending changes: the change in 
the total expenditure and the changes in the primary expenditure (i.e. total expenditure less 
interest payments). Both series are taken from the AMECO database, and are divided by 
nominal trend GDP. Lagged values of these series are used since a reverse causality 
(expenditure are adjusted to respond to revenue dynamics) cannot be a priori excluded. 
In addition, experiments based on the inclusion of changes in the inflation rate are carried 
out. This may reflect the possibility that taxes, especially the indirect ones (VAT), may be 
lowered to mitigate the impact of increases in prices on consumption goods. Similarly to 
spending, lagged values of inflation changes are used, given that taxes may impact on 
prices in the same period. 
Finally, the possibility that the ‘political orientation’ of coalitions in power in the countries 
considered, may affect the way discretionary fiscal policies are decided, is tested. To that 
aim, the information from the Dataset of Political Indicators (DPI) provided by the World 
Bank is used. In particular, the variable EXECRCL distinguishes between right, center and 
left parties according to the government orientation with respect to economic policy. Based 
on this information, for each of the 27 countries, the succession of political parties in 
charge since 1998 is reconstructed. Specifically, three dummy variables which enter as 
                                                           
15 As an alternative, one may also want to include the government deficit, instead of spending, as an additional control 
variable. However, the deficit clearly incorporates revenues, therefore problems related to endogeneity are very likely to 
arise. 23
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regressors in the baseline model are introduced, namely: i) Right takes value of one during 
the years in which parties in charge can be defined as ‘conservative’, Christian democratic, 
or right-wing, and zero otherwise; ii) Center takes value of one when the parties can best 
be described as ‘centrist’, zero otherwise; and finally iii) Left takes value of one for parties 
that are defined as communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing, and zero 
otherwise.  
As Table 10 shows, none of these additional alter significantly the baseline results. In 
particular, spending developments do not seem to be associated with revenue decisions. 
Inflation appears to be mildly significant in the regression for 
txs R ' , but it has no 
explanatory power for 
txs " ' . Finally, the political orientation of ruling parties plays no role 
in accounting for revenue developments. In all these experiments, the core findings related 
to the coefficient on the output gap are unaffected, pointing to the fact the baseline model 
seems to be well-specified. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper proposes a new approach to study the cyclical sensitivity of discretionary 
revenue policies in EU countries, based on measures of legislated revenue changes as 
provided by EU National Central Banks in the framework of the ‘ESCB disaggregated 
approach’. The findings from this analysis, which focuses on the period 1998-2008, can be 
summarized as follows. 
First, it emerges that, ex-post, legislated changes on the revenue side of the government 
budget seem to have been used in a strongly pro-cyclical way, in contrast to what emerges 
based on cyclically-adjusted indicators, which point to a-cyclicality. This result holds for 
the whole set of EU countries, but also when countries belonging to the EMU are analysed 
separately.  
Second, the observed pro-cyclicality of discretionary revenue appears to be mainly driven 
by direct taxes paid by households and social security contributions. In particular, the 
former have been significantly reduced during booming economic times, thus probably 
contributing to overheating economies which were already in an expansionary phase. 
These developments might be driven by deliberate decisions of governments to lower 
personal income taxes in booming times, as a (at least partial) compensation of losses in 
disposable income generated by the fiscal drag, in progressive tax systems.  24
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Finally, indirect taxes are the only revenue item that seems to react to the government 
debt-to-GDP ratio.  
These findings suggest that a sound identification of the discretionary component of fiscal 
policy is of key importance to appropriately assess how fiscal policies have been 
implemented over the economic cycle.  
Looking ahead, and in the spirit of Romer and Romer (2007a), a natural extension of this 
work would be to study the effects of legislated revenue changes on the economic activity 
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Table 1a. Correlation matrix of overall taxes and social contributions, 
and four sub-components computed according to the ESCB’s disaggregated approach 
 
txs R '  
txs fd  
txs de  
txs " '  
txs rs  
txs R '   1.00      
txs fd   -0.10  1.00     
txs de   0.12 0.26 1.00    
txs " '   0.37  -0.23 -0.32 1.00   
txs rs   0.75  -0.19 -0.06 -0.05 1.00 
 
Notes: Variables refer to overall taxes and social security contributions, net of temporary 
measures (txs). ¨R are changes in cyclically-adjusted values, net of temporary measures;  
fd: fiscal drag; de: decoupling of the tax base from GDP;: legislated changes; rs: residual 
component. Values reported are the simple average of single countries’ variance-covariance 




Table 1b: Correlation matrix of legislated changes 
 
txs " '  
dth " '  
dte " '  
itx " '  
sct " '  
txs " '   1.00      
dth " '   0.69 1.00      
dte " '   0.40 0.27 1.00    
itx " '   0.33 -0.02  0.02 1.00  
sct " '   0.32 0.17 -0.03  -0.21  1.00 
Notes. Variables refer to legislated changes ¨" in: overall taxes and social security 
contributions (txs);  direct taxes paid by households (dth); direct taxes paid by enterprises 
(dte); indirect taxes (itx); social security contributions (sct). Sample: 27-EU countries over 














Table 2. Estimates for overall taxes and social contributions (txs): EU-19 and EU-27  
Dependent variable: 
txs R '  
txs " '  
27 txs " '  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  IV/2SLS  OLS IV/2SLS  OLS IV/2SLS  OLS 
Output gapt  -0.086  0.036  -0.172*** -0.107*** -0.156*** -0.094*** 
  [0.072] [0.048] [0.038] [0.025] [0.034] [0.022] 
Permanentt-1  -0.271*** -0.294*** -0.045  -0.058**  -0.054*  -0.064** 
  [0.058] [0.056] [0.030] [0.029] [0.028] [0.027] 
Debtt-1  0.007 0.009 0.001 0.002 -0.001  0.000 
  [0.013] [0.013] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] 
EMU-15  -1.379*** -1.451*** -0.454*  -0.492**  -0.458**  -0.496** 
  [0.462] [0.452] [0.241] [0.235] [0.229] [0.224] 
Ti,   0.062**  0.068***  0.012 0.015 0.012 0.015 
  [0.025] [0.025] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] 
NONACTIVEi,t  -0.310***  -0.288**  0.034 0.046 0.026 0.042 
  [0.118] [0.115] [0.061] [0.060] [0.058] [0.056] 
ELECTi,t  -0.021  -0.012  0.084 0.088 0.079 0.082 
  [0.149] [0.146] [0.078] [0.076] [0.069] [0.068] 
        
Obs.  189 189 189 189 222 222 
Number  of  countries  19 19 19 19 27 27 
R-squared  0.23 0.26 0.18 0.22 0.17 0.20 
Sargan Statistic
(°)  3.23   0.00   0.03   
(P-value)  (0.07)   (0.99)   (0.85)   
Notes: *, ***, ***, significant at respectively 10, 5, and 1 per cent. Standard error in square brackets. 
(°)  Overidentifying 
restrictions test and p-value in brackets.   
 
 
Table 3. Estimates for overall taxes and social contributions: EMU countries 
Dependent variable: 
txs R '  
txs " '  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  IV/2SLS OLS  IV/2SLS OLS 
Output gapt  -0.068 0.072  -0.178***  -0.093** 
  [0.104] [0.071] [0.064] [0.044] 
Permanentt-1  -0.227*** -0.281*** -0.111**  -0.143*** 
  [0.080] [0.073] [0.049] [0.045] 
Debtt-1  -0.002 0.004  -0.002 0.002 
  [0.016] [0.015] [0.010] [0.009] 
Ti,  0.038  0.064*  0.008  0.023 
  [0.037] [0.034] [0.023] [0.021] 
NONACTIVEi,t 0.036  -0.085  -0.004  -0.077 
  [0.230] [0.217] [0.142] [0.134] 
ELECTi,t -0.210  -0.196  -0.007  0.001 
  [0.166] [0.162] [0.102] [0.100] 
      
Obs.  125 127 125 127 
Number of countries  13  15  13  15 
R-squared  0.16 0.19 0.19 0.22 
Sargan Statistic
(°)  9.86   1.14  
(P-value) (0.00)    (0.29)   
Notes: *, ***, ***, significant at respectively 10, 5, and 1 per cent. Standard error in square    
brackets. 
(°)  Overidentifying restrictions test and p-value in brackets. 30
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Table 4: Estimates for direct taxes payable by households (dth) 
Dependent variable: 
dth R '  
dth " '  
27 dth " '  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  IV/2SLS  OLS IV/2SLS  OLS IV/2SLS  OLS 
Output gapt  -0.036  -0.025  -0.115*** -0.060*** -0.107*** -0.050*** 
  [0.034] [0.023] [0.024] [0.016] [0.022] [0.014] 
Permanentt-1  -0.366*** -0.372*** -0.106**  -0.136*** -0.116**  -0.142*** 
  [0.076] [0.074] [0.053] [0.050] [0.048] [0.046] 
Debtt-1  -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
EMU-15  -0.394* -0.402* 0.020  -0.018  0.017  -0.023 
  [0.217] [0.217] [0.152] [0.146] [0.148] [0.142] 
Ti,   0.004 0.005 -0.017**  -0.016*  -0.017**  -0.015* 
  [0.012] [0.012] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
NONACTIVEi,t -0.106**  -0.102*  -0.014  0.003  -0.017  0.003 
  [0.053] [0.052] [0.037] [0.035] [0.036] [0.034] 
ELECTi,t -0.011  -0.01  -0.014  -0.012  0.001  0.002 
  [0.072] [0.071] [0.050] [0.048] [0.046] [0.044] 
        
Obs.  189 189 190 190 222 222 
Number  of  countries  19 19 19 19 27 27 
R-squared  0.20 0.21 0.10 0.16 0.07 0.14 
Sargan Statistic
(°)  8.22   1.23   0.99   
(P-value)  (0.00)   (0.27)   (0.32)   
Notes: *, ***, ***, significant at respectively 10, 5, and 1 per cent. Standard error in square brackets. 
(°)  Overidentifying 
restrictions test and p-value in brackets.   
 
Table 5: Estimates for direct taxes payable by corporations (dte) 
Dependent variable: 
dte R '  
dte " '  
27 dte " '  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  IV/2SLS  OLS IV/2SLS  OLS IV/2SLS  OLS 
Output gapt  0.095**  0.111***  0.005 0.008 0.005 0.008 
  [0.039] [0.025] [0.016] [0.011] [0.015] [0.009] 
Permanentt-1  -0.327*** -0.339*** -0.085*** -0.087*** -0.085*** -0.086*** 
  [0.064] [0.060] [0.027] [0.025] [0.025] [0.023] 
Debtt-1  0.000 0.000 -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004 
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] 
EMU-15  -0.144 -0.15  -0.108 -0.109 -0.111 -0.111 
  [0.223] [0.223] [0.094] [0.094] [0.089] [0.089] 
Ti,   0.029** 0.030** 0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004 
  [0.012] [0.012] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
NONACTIVEi,t  -0.053  -0.05 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 
  [0.054] [0.054] [0.023] [0.023] [0.022] [0.021] 
ELECTi,t  -0.066 -0.064 0.000  0.000  -0.004 -0.004 
  [0.073] [0.073] [0.031] [0.031] [0.028] [0.028] 
        
Obs.  189 189 190 190 222 222 
Number  of  countries  19 19 19 19 27 27 
R-squared  0.22 0.22 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Sargan Statistic
(°)  1.04   0.13   0.15   
(P-value)  (0.31)   (0.72)   (0.70)   
Notes: *, ***, ***, significant at respectively 10, 5, and 1 per cent. Standard error in square brackets. 
(°)  Overidentifying 
restrictions test and p-value in brackets.  
 31
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1118
November 2009
Table 6: Estimates for indirect taxes (itx) 
Dependent variable: 
itx R '  
itx " '  
27 itx " '  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  IV/2SLS  OLS IV/2SLS  OLS IV/2SLS  OLS 
Output gapt  -0.122***  -0.049*  0.001  -0.012 -0.003 -0.014 
  [0.043] [0.029] [0.023] [0.016] [0.021] [0.014] 
Permanentt-1  -0.301*** -0.289*** -0.032  -0.035  -0.034  -0.036 
  [0.048] [0.047] [0.026] [0.026] [0.024] [0.024] 
Debtt-1  0.008 0.009 0.009**  0.009**  0.008**  0.008** 
  [0.008] [0.008] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
EMU-15  -0.639** -0.720***  -0.364** -0.350** -0.359** -0.346** 
  [0.276] [0.269] [0.152] [0.150] [0.143] [0.142] 
Ti,   0.007 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 
  [0.015] [0.015] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
NONACTIVEi,t  -0.234*** -0.204*** -0.049  -0.054  -0.051  -0.056 
  [0.071] [0.068] [0.039] [0.038] [0.036] [0.036] 
ELECTi,t  -0.041 -0.035 -0.009 -0.01  -0.015 -0.016 
  [0.091] [0.089] [0.050] [0.050] [0.044] [0.044] 
        
Obs.  189 189 190 190 222 222 
Number  of  countries  19 19 19 19 27 27 
R-squared  0.22 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Sargan Statistic
(°)  0.27   5.88   6.08   
(P-value)  (0.61)   (0.02)   (0.01)   
Notes: *, ***, ***, significant at respectively 10, 5, and 1 per cent. Standard error in square brackets. 
(°)  Overidentifying 
restrictions test and p-value in brackets.   
 
Table 7: Social contribution (sct) 
Dependent variable: 
sct R '  
sct " '  
27 sct " '  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  IV/2SLS  OLS IV/2SLS  OLS IV/2SLS  OLS 
Output gapt  -0.002 0.012  -0.046**  -0.030*  -0.044**  -0.028** 
  [0.033] [0.023] [0.022] [0.015] [0.021] [0.014] 
Permanentt-1  -0.518*** -0.519*** -0.269*** -0.272*** -0.269*** -0.269*** 
  [0.074] [0.074] [0.051] [0.051] [0.047] [0.047] 
Debtt-1  0.006 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
EMU-15  -0.041  -0.055  0.09  0.074 0.086 0.071 
  [0.210] [0.208] [0.144] [0.143] [0.139] [0.138] 
Ti,   0.016 0.017 0.013*  0.014*  0.013*  0.014* 
  [0.012] [0.012] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
NONACTIVEi,t  0.017 0.022 0.053 0.058 0.053 0.059* 
  [0.053] [0.052] [0.036] [0.036] [0.035] [0.034] 
ELECTi,t  0.083 0.084 0.097**  0.098**  0.086**  0.087** 
  [0.069] [0.069] [0.048] [0.048] [0.043] [0.043] 
        
Obs.  189 189 190 190 222 222 
Number  of  countries  19 19 19 19 27 27 
R-squared  0.27 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.23 
Sargan Statistic
(°)  0.25   1.05   1.09   
(P-value)  (0.62)   (0.31)   (0.30)   
Notes: *, ***, ***, significant at respectively 10, 5, and 1 per cent. Standard error in square brackets. 
(°)  Overidentifying 
restrictions test and p-value in brackets.  32
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Notes: *, ***, ***, significant at respectively
 10, 5, and 1 pe
r 
cent. Standard error in square








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: *, ***, ***, significant at respectively
 10, 5, and 1 pe
r cent. Standard error in square

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: *, ***, ***, significant at respectively
 10, 5, and 1 
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Table 10: Testing for omitted controls 
 
Dependent variable: 
txs R '  
txs " '  
txs R '  
txs " '  
txs R '  
txs " '  
txs R '  
txs " '  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
Output gapt  -0.087 -0.173***  -0.086 -0.172***  -0.076 -0.175***  -0.092  -0.176*** 
  [0.072] [0.037] [0.072] [0.038] [0.073] [0.038]  [0.073]  [0.038] 
Permanentt-1  -0.275*** -0.046  -0.275*** -0.044  -0.290*** -0.04  -0.285***  -0.064** 
  [0.058] [0.030] [0.058] [0.030] [0.059] [0.031]  [0.060]  [0.031] 
Debtt-1  0.006 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.009 0.000  0.008  0.002 
  [0.013] [0.007] [0.013] [0.007] [0.013] [0.007]  [0.013]  [0.007] 
EMU-15  -1.403*** -0.457*  -1.408*** -0.449*  -1.319*** -0.467*  -1.273***  -0.325 
  [0.464] [0.242] [0.464] [0.242] [0.458] [0.242]  [0.477]  [0.244] 
Ti,  0.063**  0.012  0.064**  0.011  0.068***  0.01  0.068**  0.019 
  [0.025] [0.013] [0.025] [0.013] [0.025] [0.013]  [0.027]  [0.014] 
NONACTIVEi,t  -0.332*** 0.03  -0.330*** 0.037  -0.368*** 0.047  -0.334***  0.001 
  [0.122] [0.064] [0.121] [0.063] [0.121] [0.064]  [0.123]  [0.063] 
ELECTi,t -0.027  0.082  -0.026  0.084  -0.024  0.084  -0.029  0.064 
  [0.149] [0.078] [0.149] [0.078] [0.148] [0.078]  [0.152]  [0.078] 
ǻSpendingt-1
(1)  -0.033  -0.005          
  [0.048]  [0.025]          
ǻSpendingt-1
(2)    -0.036  0.005        
    [0.049]  [0.025]        
ǻInflationt-1      -0.060*  0.014     
      [0.036]  [0.019]     
Left         0.024  0.235 
         [0.623]  [0.319] 
Center         -0.305  -0.198 
         [0.655]  [0.335] 
Right         -0.057  0.164 
         [0.577]  [0.295] 
            
Obs.  189 189 189 189 189 189  189  189 
Number  of  countries  19 19 19 19 19 19  19  19 
R-squared  0.23 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.25 0.18  0.23  0.22 
Sargan Statistic
(°)  2.99 0.00 3.03 0.00 4.18 0.01  3.50  0.05 
(P-value)  (0.08) (0.97) (0.08) (0.99) (0.04) (0.92)  (0.06)  (0.83) 
 
Notes: *, ***, ***, significant at respectively 10, 5, and 1 per cent. Standard error in square brackets. 
(°)   Overidentifying 
restrictions test and p-value in brackets. 
(1) excluding interest rates, 














Table A1. Changes in the structural fiscal components (as percentage of trend GDP) from 
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Table A2: Dataset description (countries and time coverage) 





j R ' ,
j " '  
j R '  
Austria 00-08  00-08 
Belgium 98-08  98-08 
Bulgaria   06-08 
Cyprus 00-08  00-08 
Czech Rep.  98-07  98-08 
Denmark   04-08 
Estonia   04-08 
Finland 98-08  98-08 
France 98-08 98-08 
Germany 98-08  98-08 
Greece 00-08  00-08 
Hungary   04-08 
Ireland 00-08  00-08 
Italy 00-08  98-08 
Latvia 98-08 98-08 
Lithuania 98-08  98-08 
Luxembourg 00-08  00-08 
Malta 04-08 04-08 
Netherlands 00-08  98-08 
Poland 99-08  99-08 
Portugal 00-08  00-08 
Romania   06-08 
Slovakia   04-08 
Slovenia 00-08  00-08 
Spain 96-08  96-08 
Sweden     04-08 
U.K.     04-08 
Note: the first dataset also incorporates data on: i) fiscal drag (
j fd ), 
ii) decoupling of the tax base from GDP (
j de ), iii) a residual 
component (
j re ) 39
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